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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
tion such as allowing garnishment only of the community assets
contributed by the husband cannot be justified in principle since
there is no distinction within our community structure between
assets contributed by the husband and those contributed by the
wife.
Certainly, the considerations in the Green case illustrate the
need for legislative reform of our community system. The wife's
interest in community assets should be protected, but at the
same time the creditor's rights should not be defeated. Within
a framework similar to Louisiana's, the Spanish allow execution
against the community assets if the husband has insufficient
separate assets but only if such seizure will not interfere with
the payment of obligations contracted since marriage." There
are of course other possibilities. For the present, however, it
seems preferable to follow the traditional interpretation of the
law and allow execution against the community assets. Then
if the community is solvent upon dissolution, the wife can be
reimbursed 2 1 and prejudice to both wife and creditor can be
avoided.
George L. Bilbe
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WRONGFUL DEATH-ILLEGITIMATE
CHILDREN-EQUAL PROTECTION
An action was brought in behalf of five illegitimate children
for the wrongful death of their mother. The district court dis-
missed the suit holding that these children have no right of
action since the word "child" in Louisiana Civil Code Article
23151 did not include illegitimate children. This decision was
20. C6DIGO CIVIL ESPAROL arts. 1408, 1410.
21. If a separate obligation of one spouse has been paid with community
funds, then the other spouse should be reimbursed one-half the amount of this pay-
ment at dissolution. This procedure is implicit in LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2403 and
2408 and is the method of accounting proposed in Davis v. Compton, 13 La. Ann.
396 (1858).
1. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315 provides: "Every act whatever of man that causes
damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.
"The right to recover damages to property caused by an offense or quasi of-
fense is a property right which, on the death of the obligee, is inherited by his
legal instituted, or irregular heirs, subject to the community of the surviving
spouse.
"The right to recover all other damages caused by an offense or quasi offense,
if the injured person dies, shall survive for a period of one year from the death of
the deceased in favor of: (1) the surviving spouse and child or children; (2)
the surviving father and mother of the deceased, or either of them, if he left
no spouse or child surviving; and (3) the surviving brothers and sisters of the
deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse, child, or parents surviving. The
survivors in whose favor this right of action survives may also recover the
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affirmed by the court of appeal,2 and writs were subsequently
denied by the Louisiana Supreme Court.3 On review the United
States Supreme Court held, Article 2315 unconstitutional as
construed since it denied these illegitimate children equal pro-
tection under the fourteenth amendment, Section 1, of the
United States Constitution. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968) ; Glona v. American Guar. & Liab Ins. Co., 388 U.S. 73
(1968).4
While the states have always been held to have a great deal
of power to classify persons under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment, they may not arbitrarily or in-
vidiously discriminate against a particular class. In Lindsley v.
Nat'l Carbonic Gas Co.5 the Supreme Court stated the well-
settled rule:
"When the classification in such a law is called in question,
if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would
sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the
law was enacted must be assumed. One who assails the classi-
fication in such a law must carry the burden of showing it
does not vest on any reasonable basis, but is essentially
arbitrary."
Traditionally then, the question to be asked by the Supreme
Court is merely whether there is any conceivable rational basis
for the distinction in any particular legislative classification.
In Levy the majority restated the traditional rule and con-
cluded that there is no conceivable rational basis for a state law
denying illegitimate children a right of action for the wrongful
death of a parent. Justice Douglas posed several questions in an
damages which they sustain through the wrongful death of the deceased. A right
to recover damages under the provisions of this paragraph is a property right
which, on the death of the survivor in whose favor the right of action survived, is
inherited by his legal, instituted, or irregular heirs, whether suit has been insti-
tuted thereon by the survivor or not.
"As used in this article, the words 'child', 'brother', 'sister', 'father', and
,mother' include a child, brother, sister, father, and mother, by adoption respec-
tively."
2. Levy v. State, 192 So.2d 193 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
3. Levy v. State, 250 La. 25, 193 So.2d 530 (1967).
4. It was also held in a companion case that the mother of illegitimate
children is not barred from bringing an action for the wrongful death of her
illegitimate children. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 388 U.S. 83
(1968).
5. 220 U.S. 61 (1910).
6. Id. at 78-79. Accord, Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Melton, 218 U.S.
36 (1909) ; Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union County Bank, 207 U.S. 251, 256 (1907) ;
Batchel v. Wilson, 204 U.S. 36, 41 (1906) ; Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson
City, 173 U.S. 592, 615 (1898).
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apparent attempt to demonstrate the lack of a rational basis for
the discrimination against illegitimates. He asked:
"When the child's claim of damage for loss of his mother
is in issue, why, in terms of 'equal protection' should the
tortfeasors go free merely because the child is illegitimate?
Why should the illegitimate child be denied rights merely
because of his birth out of wedlock?' '7
The majority also pointed out that the legitimacy or illegitimacy
of the children has no connection with the wrong suffered by
the mother and that it is invidious to discriminate against the
children when no action on their part was relevant to the harm
done the mother.8
In the dissent to both the Levy case and Glona v. American
Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., Justice Harlan attacked the failure of
the majority to heed the traditional rule of constitutional law
that the equal protection clause does not require that all persons
be treated absolutely alike regardless of the circumstances. 9 He
stated that the Louisiana statute for wrongful death follows the
pattern of most state statutes and establishes classes of persons
who may bring the action. 0 This is done to prevent the courts
from having to hear offers of proof of loss of love and affec-
tion and economic plight from everyone who feels he can show
some deprivation as a result of the victim's death. He also
pointed out that what the majority says about loss of love and
affection and dependency has no necessary relevance to the
workings of Article 2315. The dissent stated:
"[A] grown man may sue for the wrongful death of his
parents he did not love, even if the death relieves him of a
great economic burden or entitles him to a large inheritance.
A man may recover for the death of his wife, whether
he loved her or not, but may not recover for the death of
his paramour.":"'
7. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968). Justice Harlan points out
in the dissent that Mrs. Levy left a legitimate parent, and thus it is erroneous
to say the tortfeasors go free. Id. at 80-81.
8. Id. at 72.
9. 391 U.S. 68, 80-81 (1968). See F. BURDIOK, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION § 279 (1922).
10. At common law there was no action for wrongful death since actions
could not survive the death of the victim. W. BEALL, WRONGFUL DEATH AND
SuRvIvoRsHIP § 1.1 (1958). It was hardly equitable that a tortious act that
resulted in death should serve as a windfall to the wrongdoer. This inequity was
removed in England by the Fatal Accident Act, often referred to as Lord
Campbell's Act. S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 1.7 (1966). Most
American wrongful death statutes, including Louisiana's, are modeled after this
act.
11. 391 U.S. 68, 79 (1968).
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It is true, as the majority pointed out, that the illegitimates suf-
fered a wrong when their mother died, just as if they had been
legitimate, but this is academic since the right to sue is not
based solely on a showing of suffering and loss.
The dissent answered the question of the majority, "Why
should the illegitimate child be denied rights merely because
of his birth out of wedlock?," and in doing so demonstrated that
there is a rational basis for the distinction between legitimates
and illegitimates as made by Article 2315. Justice Harlan rea-
soned that if the state can require the marriage relation be
formalized, it can also require that rights dependent on family
ties be formalized. In Louisiana the right to recover for wrong-
ful death is thus based on one's legal status as husband or
wife, son or daughter, or mother or father. It is certainly rea-
sonable that the state insist on formalized proof of such status
rather than force the court to inquire into the status of each
person seeking recovery.
Judge Yarrut, speaking for the Louisiana Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeal offered still another rational basis for this
classification. He stated that to "deny illegitimate children the
right to recover in such a case is actually based on morals and
the general welfare because it discourages bringing children in
the world out of wedlock."
12
The Levy case follows some recent decisions 13 in which the
court has forced its preferences upon society, as Justice Harlan
says, by "brute force," with apparent disregard for the tradi-
tional rules of constitutional law. It has been traditionally ac-
cepted that a rational basis is all that is necessary to sustain a
classification under the fourteenth amendment. Although the
majority paid lip service to the traditional rule,14 it is sub-
mitted that the court failed genuinely to search for a rational
basis for the classification. This is quite apparent by the demon-
stration by Justice Harlan that the state's insistence on formal-
ized proof of paternity is a very reasonable grounds for dis-
tinguishing between legitimates and illegitimates.
Considering the plight of illegitimates there might be some
justification for the result reached by the majority in Levy. The
illegitimate child is likely to be born under conditions much
less favorable than the legitimate child and be handicapped
12. Levy v. State, 192 So.2d 193, 195 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
13. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
14. 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
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from the beginning of its existence. Thus the denial of rights
to money or property serves only to increase the burden on the
state.I5Assuming there is at least one rational basis for a par-
ticular classification in our system of tri-partite government
it is the function of the legislature, not the courts, to change
the law if it works inequitable results for a certain class of per-
sons.'6 The majority would do well to heed the words of the late
Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in Morey v. Doud:
"In applying the Equal Protection Clause, we must be fas-
tidiously careful to observe the admonitions of Mr. Justice
Brandeis, Mr. Justice Stone, and Mr. Justice Cardozo that
we do not sit as a super legislature.""
Since the decision in the Levy case was rendered there has
been much speculation as to its possible effects. The initial ques-
tion to be asked is whether the decision applies when there are
legitimate as well as illegitimate children surviving the parent.
This writer concludes that the Court intended the decision to
raise the status of illegitimates to that of legitimates since,
according to the majority, one must now show only biological
proof of paternity and dependency on the deceased parent to
qualify under the statute. Aside from this problem there is a
vital concern about the possibility that this rationale might be
extended to the law of successions.,, If the reasoning were ex-
tended with retrospective application, great uncertainty of own-
ership would result, destroying the security of land titles. There
is little doubt that the rationale of this decision could be extend-
ed to hold the Louisiana law of successions as it involves both
intestacy and forced heirship to be a denial of equal protection.19
Just as Article 2315 creates classes that are beneficiaries of the
right to bring an action in wrongful death, the Code provides
15. See Comment, 28 LA. L. REV. 110, 124 (1967).
16. This situation is somewhat analogous to that which brought the wrongful
death statutes into existence. The law as it existed before Lord Campbell's Act
worked inequities and then the legislature enacted statutes to remedy this situation.
17. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 475 (1957).
18. In a recent North Dakota Supreme Court case concerning this issue of
extending the Levy rationale to the successions area, the court stated that the
question was whether the classification (between legitimate and illegitimate
children) was reasonable and necessary to effect the purpose of the law. Citing
Levy v. Louisiana, the court held not, saying that such statutes constituted in-
vidious discrimination against illegitimate children and thus were in violation of
the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. See U.S.L.W. 2303-2304
(December 3, 1968), citing Michaelsen v. Undhjem, 162 N.W.2d 861 (N.D. 1968).
19. Justice Harlan warns of this possibility in his dissent: "That suits for
wrongful death, actions to determine the heirs of intestates, and the like must as
a constitutional matter deal with every claim of biological paternity or maternity
on its merits is an exceedingly odd proposition." 391 U.S. 68, 80-81 (1968).
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similar classifications which discriminate against illegitimates
in the law of successions.2- This notion that the distribution of
successions is clearly within the power of the legislature is as-
serted in Minor v. Young:
"There is no inherent right in anyone to succeed to the estate
of a person deceased, and the rules of transmission or devo-
lution of property in such cases are left to the wisdom of the
state."2 1
It is beyond the scope of this Note to predict what the Su-
preme Court will do if confronted with the question of constitu-
tionality of Louisiana's successions law. There are, however,
several policy considerations and factual distinctions that weigh
against the application of Levy in the area of inheritance law.
The problems presented in the transfer of property after the
death of a parent of an illegitimate would be awesome. Under
an extension of the Levy rationale the illegitimate would become
the owner of property just as any other forced heir. The Louisi-
ana Supreme Court has held that ". . . the owner may ignore a
sale of his property by one who had no authority to sell it and
may bring a petitory action to recover it." ' The legitimate heir
or heir named in a will could sell property of the succession
without any knowledge that there were illegitimate heirs. The
vendee would thus have no method of protection since no system
exists to provide notice that a person, either single or married,
has illegitimate children lurking in the shadows of the family
tree. A subsidiary problem involves the question of proof of pa-
ternity to establish one's right to inherit. The Code provides a
method for proving paternal descent, 3 but it was not designed
to handle the litigation that would arise as a result of allowing
illegitimates to inherit. The fact the Louisiana courts have not
allowed blood tests in the determination of paternity would fur-
ther cloud this problem.
2 4
An important factual difference between the wrongful death
action and succession law is that the wrongful death action is a
relatively new addition to the law, for the action did not lie at
common law and was unknown until the 19th century. 25 Thus
the action for wrongful death does not have tradition for
20. LA. CIV. CODE art. 902.
21. 149 La. 583, 588, 89 So. 757, 759 (1920).
22. Long v. Chalain, 187 La. 507, 516, 175 So. 42, 46 (1937).
23. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 208-210.
24. Williams v. Williams, 230 La. 1, 87 So.2d 707 (1956).
25. S. SFEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 1.7 (1966).
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discrimination as is found in the successions law with its dis-
crimination against illegitimates. For centuries, under both com-
mon and civil law, illegitimates and legitimates have received
different treatment with regard to inheritance.26 The Court in
recent years, however, has felt less bound by tradition, as Jus-
tice Douglas wrote in Levy:
"We have been extremely sensitive when it comes to basic
civil rights and have not hesitated to strike down an invidi-
ous classification even though it had history and tradition
on its side. '27
Yet it is not a novel or radical idea that illegitimates should be
beneficiaries in a wrongful death action. Quite a few states had
allowed the action to be brought by illegitimates prior to the
Levy decision.2 However, the vast majority of these states dis-
criminate in favor of legitimates in their inheritance law.29
Wrongful death statutes were enacted to compensate for loss of
support, love, companionship, and for grief, and mental an-
guish.3° The purpose of successions law, however, is to distribute
the property of the deceased. 31
It is arguable that there is a rational basis for distinguishing
between legitimate and illegitimate children concerning their
right to bring an action in wrongful death. The dissent in Levy
adequately demonstrated that it is reasonable for illegitimates
not to be allowed to sue for wrongful death, and this is the
proper test of constitutionality. The Court should not consider
the wisdom of the classification nor the hardship that it might
work in certain circumstances. It is hoped the reasoning of Levy
will not be compounded by the extension of this same reasoning
to successions law. Aside from the argument that the distinc-
tions between legitimate and illegitimate children are reasonable
when used in determining inheritance rights and thus meet the
constitutional requirements of the equal protection clause, the
policy considerations and differences in factual situations should
overwhelmingly dictate that the rationale of Levy not be ap-
plied to inheritance law. In short, the Constitution does not com-
26. W. Rollison, LAw OF WILLS § 35 (1939).
27. 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
28. S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVORSHip § 10.4
(1966).
29. W. ROLLISON, LAW OF WILLS § 35 (1939).
30. Comment, 6 TUL. L. REV. 201, 223 (1932).
31. W. ROLLISON, LAW OF WILLS § 1 (1939).
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mand an extension of the Levy rationale to successions, and this
writer hopes that the Supreme Court will recognize that such an
extension would be very undesirable.
Herschel E. Richard, Jr.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION - TAXPAYER'S STANDING To SUE
Plaintiffs sought to enjoin defendants from the allegedly un-
constitutional expenditure of federal funds to finance certain
instruction in religious schools, and to purchase textbooks and
other instructional materials for use in these schools. Such ex-
penditures, authorized by the Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act of 1965,1 were alleged to be in contravention of the
Establishment And Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment.2 Plaintiffs rested their standing to challenge the statute
on the fact that each pays income taxes to the United States.
Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of standing to sue was
sustained by a three-j udge district court for the Western District
of New York, one judge dissenting. On appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, held, reversed, one justice dissenting.
Federal taxpayers have standing to challenge an exercise of the
congressional spending power alleged to be in violation of the
establishment clause of the Constitution. Flast v. Cohen, 88 S.
Ct. 1942 (1968).
It is a basic maxim of federal jurisdiction that "the consti-
tutionality of an act of government can only be decided when
raised as a justiciable issue."'3 Since "standing" is an aspect of
justiciability, 4 a litigant may attack an act of Congress as un-
constitutional only if he has standing to make the challenge.5
Although the origins of this concept are unclear, it has been
suggested that it is a policy of judicial self-limitation that can
be traced back to a general reluctance of courts to interfere in
the affairs of the king.0 It has also been suggested that standing
1. 79 Stat. 27 (1965), 20 U.S.C. 821 (Supp. II, 1967).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. Comment, 45 YALE L.J. 649, 650 (1936). See also C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 13 (1963).
4. Flast v. Cohen, 88 S.Ct. 1942 (1968).
5. E.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Lewis, Constitutional
Rights and the Misuse of "Standing," 14 STAN. L. REv. 433 (1962).
6. Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HAv. L. REv. 338 (1923). Here
the author argues that standing is part of a general tendency of courts of non-
interference with what they consider "political" questions. He traces this back
to the Talmud. This view was challenged in Weston, Political Questions, 38 HARV.
L. REv. 296 (1925).
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